Jan Patočka and the Three Movements of Human Existence: From Asubjective to Trans-Subjective Contexts

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Czech philosopher, Jan Patočka is increasingly considered to be one of the most important phenomenologists of the 20th century. As with Merleau-Ponty, Patočka’s intellectual path is shaped by an enduring critical engagement with Husserl and Heidegger’s respective versions of phenomenology. The present paper takes up Patočka’s later thought, which is characterized by the interplay of three interrelated but incomplete trends: the turn towards an asubjective phenomenology, the elaboration of the “three movements of human existence”, and a phenomenological philosophy of history. In turn, these emerge from his dissatisfaction with his earlier elaborations of the “natural world”, his unfinished attempt to elucidate a negative Platonism, and his enduring interest in the world horizon. The present paper seeks to reconstruct Patočka’s turn towards movement and its connections to the temporality of history and the asubjective field, as part of a broader project to reconsider modalities of trans-subjective doing and the institution of social worlds.

Introduction

Only an examination of the mutual relations of all these movements would provide a picture of the natural world, the Lebenswelt, the world of human life. We are still far from having resolved this problem.¹

Jan Patočka’s later work in the 1960s and beyond saw him pursuing different, but overlapping, lines of thought.² They include his turn towards an asubjective phenomenology, the elaboration of the three movements of human existence, and his rethinking of the meaning of history. These are to be understood within the overall context of the most permanent problematic for Patočka’s thought: the phenomenology of the world. Although Ludger Hagedorn argues that “movement” is to be regarded as the “Leitmotiv” of Jan Patočka’s thought,³ the present paper suggests that, as the problematic of movement first becomes apparent as a theme in the 1960s, it is better regarded as interwoven with his asubjective phenomenology.⁴ Patočka’s interest in an asubjective phenomenology and the three movements of existence emerged as ways of exploring phenomenology beyond Husserl and Heidegger, through shifting phenomenology away from a disproportionate focus on the subject/subjectivity. This aspect emerges gradually—and not always systematically—in Patočka’s thought. In particular, it arose from his critique of Husserl’s philosophy of consciousness, and what he called Heidegger’s “anthropologism”, which for him indicated the over-emphasis on the “humanness” of Dasein in relation to the manifestation of Being and the world. More broadly, both the three movements of existence and asubjective phenomenology are to be understood as part of Patočka’s continued engagement with the problematic of the world, which, as Dominic Jervolino

² In marking the emergence of Patočka’s later thought, various dates suggest themselves. For the purposes of this paper, 1967 seems the most convenient, as it was the year in which he wrote “The ‘Natural’ World and Phenomenology”, which contains an important discussion of the three movements of existence. Jan Patočka, “The ‘Natural’ World and Phenomenology”, in Jan Patočka, Philosophy and Selected Writings, trans. Erazim Kohak. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).
⁴ For further discussion of Patočka, the world and movement, see, for example, Filip Karfík, Unendlich werden durch die Endlichkeit. (Würzburg: Könighausen und Neumann, 2008), and Renaud Barbaras, L’ouverture du monde. Lecture de Jan Patočka. (Paris: Vrin, 2011).
put it,⁵ is the “great speculative theme” of Patočka’s life.⁶ Indeed, the increasing emphasis on movement was part of Patočka’s aim to argue for the problematic of the world as a non-subjective horizon of dynamic manifestation.⁷

The present paper brings these interlocking threads together, although it has a particular focus on the shift in Patočka’s articulation of the “three movements of human existence”. Through hermeneutical engagement with two central texts in which Patočka elaborates the three movements of human existence—the lectures in Body, Community, Language, World⁸ and the later Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History⁹ respectively—this paper argues that a further, emergent thematic is discernible in Patočka’s thought that sees an expansion of his non-subjective phenomenology from asubjective contexts—as the relation of the “human condition” to the world through embodiment (be it singular or intersubjective)—to include trans-subjective contexts, as the domain of sociality, properly speaking (I return to this).¹⁰ Thus, for present purposes, I shall refer to Patočka’s late work as a “non-subjective” in an overarching sense. The underlying argument of this paper is that the trans-subjective dimension of sociality, as the work of the “anonymous collective”, is fundamental to the human condition (and irreducible to intersubjective contexts). As such, any philosophical anthropology (which generally has focussed on the “human person” as subjective or inter-subjective) requires a sociological anthropology to do justice to human condition in the plurality of its modalities, regions and dimensions.¹¹ In this sense, the present paper is less interested in the human condition as the embodied self (asubjective), but, rather, in its instituted (in the broadest sense) openness as a condition of being-in-the-world, and its trans-subjective horizons. These anonymous, trans-subjective horizons are historical (which speaks to cultural diversity) and anthropological (which speaks to a minimum of cultural commonality and the possibility of mutual understanding). They are manifest in the various social-historical cultural articulations of the world (as social imaginary significations, to draw on Castoriadis), which are concretized and articulated as the self-institution of society itself, and in the socio-political institutions of each society.

The importance of the conception of “movement” is discernible in Patočka’s thought from about 1964 (the Aristotle book) and is apparent in a number of other essays, whilst the emergence of the “three movements of human existence” starts to appear in his thought around 1967, and, again, is elaborated in a number of different places.¹² The present paper takes up two of Patočka’s different articulations of the three movements: the 1967 lectures of Body, Community, Language, World and the 1975 Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History.¹³ Patočka’s overall aim is to place the concept of “movement” as its “basic concept and principle”¹⁴ at the centre of a non-subjective horizon of dynamic manifestation.

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⁶ This is seen from Patočka’s earliest work onwards, most notably his 1936 Habilitationsschrift.
⁸ Ibid.
⁹ Patočka, Heretical Essays.
¹⁰ The term “trans-subjective” is taken from Johann P. Arnason’s phenomenological sociology. (See, for example, Johann P. Arnason, Civilizations in Dispute. (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2003), especially chapter 4. The argument to be pursued here focuses on the “trans-subjective” as part of an approach to the human condition that understands culture as an “element of the world”, and, in a radicalization of the phenomenological critique of the subject/object divide, articulates the world as both a trans-subjective and trans-objective horizon. In this sense, the shift from asubjective to trans-subjective contexts in Patočka’s thought as a shift away from a focus on “the self” or the “human person” to the properly social domain of the trans-subjective sphere, onto which the world, as an articulation of culture, opens. This occurs in interplay with the proto-movement of the world as a trans-objective horizon.
¹¹ Cornelius Castoriadis refers to this domain of human social reality as the “collective anonymous”.
¹³ A systematic reconstruction of these texts goes beyond the scope of this paper; as such what is offered here can only be considered the preliminary contours of a larger problematic and research project.
phenomenological philosophy of the world as a qualitative, dynamic process of manifestation. However, he wants to go one step further and argue that “it is not just that movement belongs to existence, rather, existence is movement”.  

In *Body, Community, Language, World*, Patočka’s elaboration of the three movements of existence is found primarily in “Lecture 17” and “Lecture 18”. Building on the previous lectures in *Body, Community, Language, World*, “Lecture 17” begins with a general acceptance of Heidegger’s understanding of “care” as the core existential structure of *Dasein*. “Care” is a “project in a given situation which brings us into contact with things, a situation in which the things with which we deal and which we modify are revealed”. Patočka’s aim is to theorize “care” not as a threefold moment but as a trinity of interrelated movements that are essential to human existence. Central to his articulation at this time (and, indeed, during the 1960s more broadly), is the importance of “lived experience” as the fundamental corporeity of our existence.

Patočka then goes on to summarize the main philosophical approaches to movement. As with Husserl and Heidegger before him, he aims to go beyond the subject/object dichotomy. As he saw it, philosophical modernity, represented by Descartes and Galileo, inaugurated the reduction of movement to locomotion as quantifiable, uniform, and static. The significance of (qualitative) transformation is excluded from this understanding of movement; instead the sense of “governed and governable” (which can be more generally understood as forms of rational mastery) was paramount and provided the basis for the expansion of technology. Bergson provides the prime example of a subjective conception of movement, which Patočka articulates as a perpetually “lived temporal structure” that is organized around an inner synthetic unity rather like a “melody” in which the “actually present lived experience unfolds against the background of former lived experiences, of what remains alive of the former. The past flows into what is present. The former lingers on, there is an accumulation of what has been”. Yet it is precisely this “passive cumulation of experience” as the basis of life which Bergson overemphasizes, in Patočka’s view (although he does not further elaborate).

Patočka finds a deeper, stronger sense of movement in Aristotle’s conception as “transformation, as possibility being realized”; that is drawing on the notion of dynamis and alloiosis. In turn, he links this back to Heidegger’s understanding of life as a realization of possibilities: “ours is a life of possibilities which are not indifferent, lifeless possibilities, rather, the possibilities in which we are involved, in which we transcend the … movement is not a result, as sediment, but rather a process of realization”, although he is later careful to unpack the differences between Aristotelian and existentialist notions of movement and possibility of change as “life as a possibilities in a process of realization”. The proto-model of movement is the living being, where “life itself is the goal of each individual movement” and the realization of certain (determinate) possibilities. Unlike Bergson, for Aristotle movement is futural: it unfolds something that is not yet as the “movement of a self-constituting being”. Nonetheless, Aristotle’s elaboration of movement (as qualitative change)
involves an unchanging substrate as its precondition and is in this way still too “static” and “objective” to be helpful in the human realm of existence, for Patočka. He thus proposes to radicalize Aristotle: “the possibilities that ground movement have no pre-existing bearer, no necessary referent standing statically at their foundation, but rather all synthesis, all inner interconnection of movement takes place within it alone”.25 In so doing, Patočka identifies the corporeity of lived experience (drawing on the Husserlian distinction between Körper and Leib) and dynamis as a possibility the not yet present, “that can take the given into itself and forge a unified meaning”26 as essential aspects of this phenomenologised, radicalized sense of movement as existence: “the key to the answer lies in the concept of lived corporeity … Lived corporeity is precisely something living, a part of life, of the vital process, and so is itself a process, not only something at the base of the process of living but its condition in a sense wholly different from that of a hypokeimenon”.27

Patočka now arrives at the three movements of existence proper, although he does not articulate any of them at great length. They are the movements of, first, anchoring; second, of self-sustenance; and, third, of transcendence. Each movement comprises a distinctive temporal dimension, has a particular referent, and, in Heideggerian fashion, displays authentic and inauthentic modes. In addition, the first two movements display a particular boundary situation. The first movement Patočka refers to is that of anchoring, or sinking roots. Patočka elaborates it as an instinctive-affective movement that is in “harmony with the world”, whilst exerting control over our bodily self. It is primordial in that it co-determines life in all other human regions, yet it is repressed and different from animal modes in that it is takes place within–and is refracted through–the clearing of the second and third movements. Nonetheless, for Patočka, this first movement is in some sense the most fundamental as it is that which allows humans to have a world not only “individual entities” (as per animals, although this remains implicit).28

Patočka understands the three movements as interrelated, shared and intersubjective.29 In the case of the first movement, this is evident in the human dependence on another for safety, warmth, sympathy, protection, etc. For both the first and second movement the earth—“that is motionless, that is eternally the unshakable ground”—is the referent for bodily movement, as such.30 Its boundary situation (which Patočka takes from Jaspers) is contingency, of which Patočka lists: biological, situational, traditional (customs), and individual (skills).31 Its inauthentic side—a kind of self-concealment, “a primordial inauthenticity”—becomes apparent in interaction with the second movement as it is repressed and marginalized by the “utilitarian, pragmatic” movement of work.

The second movement is that of self-sustenance and self-projection, and it corresponds to the region of work (although in the context of Body, Community, Language, World it is always understood in terms of an embodied self). It is the sphere of purposiveness, production and reproduction (the reproduction of life, not biological reproduction, the extension of what Patočka calls “our inorganic body, our existing into things”, as the sphere of “meaning”. The temporal dimension to which it corresponds is the present, and is characterized by our “coming to terms with what is given in the form of things”. Its boundary situation is evinced in conflict, suffering and guilt, whilst its inauthenticity is shown as the failure to understand oneself which blinds others and oneself, and is connected to these interweaving situations of conflict, suffering and guilt. This is because this domain of human existence is “interested”, where people are anonymous in that they are reduced to

25 Ibid., 146-47.
26 Ibid., 147.
27 Ibid., 155.
28 Ibid., 148-49.
29 Ibid., 149.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., 150.
their social roles. These first two movements find their self-realization within human finitude, submitting to the rule of “power” of the Earth.  

The third movement of existence in a stronger, narrower sense that “seeks to bestow a global closure and meaning on the regions and rhythms of the first and second movement”, which he elsewhere characterizes as the movement of “truth”, but which here seems to carry with it more a notion of “transcendence”. It is the movement of “self-achievement”, and seeks to break through our “earthliness”. It seeks to integrate finitude, situatedness, mortality into existence, was that to which we were previously blind. Existence in this strong sense comes to term with all the different aspects of the various movements and integrates them into a whole. Here Patočka identifies its inauthentic mode as being blinded by finitude, whilst its corresponding temporal dimension is the future: “existence in the sense of the third movement, is neither a matter of sinking roots in the world nor the prolongation of being but rather a task for all of life in its integrity”.  

As we have seen, “lived corporeity” forms the basis of Patočka’s elaboration of the three movements in the 1967 lectures in *Body, Community, Language, World*. More broadly, he tells us that “to understand existence as movement means to grasp humans as beings in and of the world. They are beings that not only are in the world, as Heidegger tells us…but rather are themselves a part of the world process”. Although each movement is “shared” with others, this is conceptualized in terms of intersubjectivity rather than sociality, properly speaking. When we consider his elaborations of the three movements in *Heretical Essays*, which he wrote almost a decade later, however, the situation seems somewhat different. Here the three movements are contextualized in terms of history instead of corporeity; this brings into relief not only the asubjective but also the trans-subjective contexts of the human condition and the world process. Indeed, the three movements are not so much contextualized within but embedded into a broader consideration of historical modalities and the trans-subjective modalities of the “sphere of openness” as central to the human condition. Although Aristotle’s articulation of the tripartite soul (vegetative, animate, rational) is one source for Patočka’s three movements, his shift to a rethinking of history (which sits between a philosophy of history and the history of philosophy) can also be understood as his way of making sense of the Axial Age (he referred to Jaspers, for example), the “civilizational condition” more generally, and the uniqueness and significance of the ancient Greek breakthrough to political freedom and institution of the democratic polis, in particular. As such, an account of human existence as “lived corporeity” requires articulations of broader institutional and social dimensions of existence that have their basis in trans-subjective contexts. This is the domain of social reality proper—of culture and institution—that is irreducible to embodied and intersubjective analyses and as such requires its own articulation.

The first essay in *Heretical Essays* elaborates Patočka’s understanding of the natural world as the “pre-historical” world rather than the “pre-scientific” world in the Husserlian sense. Here he finds Husserl’s idealism wanting. Heidegger’s notion of “openness” is something that Patočka finds more congenial for his own thought: “humans in their inmost being are nothing other than this

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32 Ibid., 149-51.  
33 Ibid., 148.  
34 For example in Patočka, *Heretical Essays*.  
35 Ibid., 151.  
36 Ibid., 155-56.  
37 There are some incipient openings towards the trans-subjective dimension of life, especially in Lecture 18, Patočka, *Body, Community, Language, World*, but these are clearer again in Patočka, *Heretical Essays*.  
In turn, “the structure of openness entails a double conception of the phenomenon. The openness of human being-in-the-world, first of all, lets what-is appear, manifest itself, become a phenomenon”. The term “openness” also seems to refer to Heidegger’s Lichtung (although Patočka does not explicitly use this term), which take on a trans-subjective hue through a philosophical rearticulation of the domain of history that is irreducible to intersubjective modalities. It is worth quoting him in full:

If we strip Husserl’s ‘noematic sphere’ of the sense of the immanent transcendence we come close to what Heidegger calls the open region (overlooking Husserl’s one-sided preoccupation with objects). It is this sphere which represents, in a particular ‘epoch’, the possibilities of the phenomenon of what-is uncovered. The region of openness is not identical with the universe of what-is, but is, rather, that which can be uncovered as existent in a particular epoch. That means that it is the world of a particular epoch, if by ‘the world’ we understand the structure of the way that what there is can appear to humans at a particular age … In the play of manifestation’s unconcealment, they [the things] show themselves as what they are, thus demonstrating their seriousness. Their manifestation, however, is itself historical, and that in two ways: as the uncovering of what is and as the emergence of the structures of being which thus cannot stand out into openness other than historically.

From the above passage, we can see that the “natural world” is elaborated as historical (or pre-historical, strictly speaking), that the world manifests itself in and as historical constellations as the domain of social meaning, and can be understood neither via materialism nor idealism. Indeed, according to Patočka, it can only be understood as the totality of basic modes of human behaviour, and in turn, of their presuppositions and sedimentations. In Heretical Essays, the first movement of existence is understood as “non-historical”, the second as “pre-historical” and the third as “historical” in the strong sense of the term. Each movement is still considered to have its own temporality, but these are no longer considered as “temporal-historical”, and the “world” in question is the “common world of humans”, no longer in the sense of all human persons (as in Body, Community, Language, World) but all human societies.

The most systematic articulation of the three movements in Heretical Essays is found in the second essay. Identified as the movement of acceptance, defence and truth, respectively, here he articulates them as having their own original form, meaning and temporality. Each movement has two aspects, although Patočka no longer characterizes these in terms of “authenticity” and “inauthenticity”. The first movement is still seen in terms of a harmony and introduction to the world, but here the “interested” (as opposed to “indifferent”) aspect involved the demand for justice and a co-existence with others (especially the patriarchal family of Hellenic or Roman antiquity): “the father, raising up from the ground the infant laid at his feet, carries out an act of acceptation which bears within it a relation to all the horizons of temporality”, that introduces the child into a world that is not only embodied but socio-cultural, even at that micro level.

The second movement of defence (which he also sometimes calls “self-surrender”) is entwined with the first, and is still characterized as “work”. The emphasis on his articulation of work is its mode as oriented to the present, and its oscillating sense of “burdensome” and “alleviation”. Included in the first two movements explicitly include the early empires that involves “all that has

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39 Ibid., 6. The “sphere of openness” is clearly linked to the “field of manifestation”, and, as such, its articulation is fundamental to Patočka’s later thought. The sphere of openness provides another way into the articulation of trans-subjective contexts of the human condition.
40 Ibid., 7.
41 Ibid., 7-8, 9-10.
42 Ibid., 10.
43 Ibid., 11, more particularly, in the sense of all human societies, civilizations and polities.
44 Ibid., 29-33.
to do with the order, sustenance, and organization of society”, as well as “high civilizations” with “writing, with its petrified memory, does not arise in the context of human acts aimed at endowing life with a new meaning”. Nonetheless, Patočka goes on to tell us, “it brings about a new presence of the past and the possibility of the far-ranging reflection that is exhibited in poetry and its immense influence throughout the entire oikoumene at the time”.

The third movement—the movement of “truth”–is always present in some way in the first two movements. Patočka also articulates the three movements in terms of the trans-subjective nature of their historical context and relation to the world: the “nonhistorical” first movement takes place in the anonymous past; the second movement of prehistory sees collective memory (or, perhaps, following the recent work of Egyptologist Jan Assmann, “cultural memory”) preserved in a “written tradition”, and the third movement, as the level of history proper, as the emergence into “truth”. Interestingly, Patočka goes on to briefly discuss Oskar Becker’s analysis of three civilizational types—“basal”, “low”, and those of the historical age—“in which the principal theme is the unfolding of the possibility basic to human beings, to win or lose themselves”. Here Patočka wants to continue to prepare a space for the uniqueness of the ancient Greek trajectory, and the entering into “history proper” as the movement of truth and political freedom (from which his later “care for the soul” is directly linked). Patočka’s elucidation of the three movements of life in the Heretical Essays also draws on and reconfigures Hannah Arendt’s tripartite social-political ontology of labour, work and action as “free human activity”: “this new human possibility is based on the mutual recognition of humans as free and equal, a recognition which must be continuously acted out, in which activity does not have the character of enforced toil, like labour, but rather of the manifestation of excellence”. A life of freedom is essentially an “unsheltered” life:

Such life does not seek to escape its contingency, but neither does it yield to it passively; since it has glimpsed the possibility of authentic life, that is, life as a whole, the world opens itself to it for the first time—it is no longer merely an involuntary background against which that which concerns us shows itself; rather it itself can now stand forth, as the whole of that which opens up against the black backdrop of closed now. This whole now speaks to humans directly, free of the muting effect of tradition and myth, only by it do they seek to be accepted and held responsible. Nothing of the earlier life of acceptance remains in peace; all the pillars of the community, traditions, and myths, are equally shaken, as are all the answers that once preceded questions, the modest, yet secure and soothing meaning, though not lost is transformed.

Clearly, we are here far removed from the asubjective contexts of lived corporeity. Rather we find ourselves in the domain of history (and the “civilizational condition”) as trans-subjective modalities. Patočka’s articulation of the three movements in the Heretical Essays still situates them in an existential sense (which, for reasons of space, I have glossed over here), but they overwhelmingly emphasize the trans-subjective articulation of particular social-historical

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46 Ibid., 34.
47 Ibid., 35.
48 Ibid., 34-5. Art is a futural modality and thus belongs to the third movement of truth.
49 Ibid., 33.
51 Patočka, Heretical Essays, 35-36.
52 One of the limitations of Patočka’s thought is the hierarchical ordering of civilizations, and, concomitantly, the view that “world history” begins with the Ancient Greek breakthrough to political freedom. Interestingly, in his discussion of the third movement in Body, Community, Language, World, his examples come from the Christian and Buddhist traditions rather than the Greek. But, in line with the argument developed in this paper, the Christian and Buddhist examples in Patočka, Body, Community, Language, World were to illustrate modalities of corporeity, whereas in Patočka, Heretical Essays, the Greek example is anchored in the region of history.
53 Patočka, Heretical Essays, 37-39, emphasis in the original.
54 Ibid., 39-40.
formations in the diversity and particularity (and promise) of historical trajectories and instituted “articulations of the world”. These historical trajectories are vital to understanding the human condition as a “unity in diversity”. There is a further aspect to trans-subjective contexts, however: the more strictly anthropological layer of the human condition that he begins to articulate as part of his asubjective phenomenology as “the sphere of openness” (which Patočka begins to elucidate in the Heretical Essays), or what he elsewhere terms the “field of manifestation”, and which we might also term a “cultural clearing”. But further discussion of this aspect is beyond the scope of this presentation.

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